论文标题
搜索游戏中的社会福利，具有不对称信息
Social Welfare in Search Games with Asymmetric Information
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑玩家在其中寻找隐藏奖的游戏，并且他们有有关奖品地点的不对称信息。我们研究这些游戏均衡的社会回报。我们提供了足够的条件，以实现均衡，该均衡产生了第一好的回报（即，在任何策略概况下的最高社会收益），我们表征了第一最好的回报。结果对创新竞赛和研发竞赛具有有趣的影响。
We consider games in which players search for a hidden prize, and they have asymmetric information about the prize location. We study the social payoff in equilibria of these games. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium that yields the first-best payoff (i.e., the highest social payoff under any strategy profile), and we characterize the first-best payoff. The results have interesting implications for innovation contests and R&D races.
