论文标题
优化顺序陪审团的投票令：中位选民定理及其他
Optimizing Voting Order on Sequential Juries: A Median Voter Theorem and Beyond
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑了一个奇怪的“陪审团”，该陪审团在两种自然国家（例如A和B，或无辜和有罪）之间进行了顺序投票，以决定判决的多数意见。陪审员在[-1，+1]中以信号的形式具有私人信息，较高的信号表明可能更有可能。每个陪审员具有[0,1]的能力，该能力与给定信号的概率成正比，即二元信号的condorcet p的类似物。我们假设陪审员诚实地投票赞成他们对替代方案的看法，鉴于他们的信号和事先投票，因为他们是想要提高声誉的专家（在他们的投票和自然的实际状态之后被揭示出来）。对于固定的陪审团能力，判决的可靠性取决于投票令。对于第三大陪审团，最佳排序始终如下：中等能力，然后是最高能力，然后最低。对于足够的异质陪审团，顺序投票比同时投票更可靠，实际上是最佳的（允许进行非冬季投票）。当固定平均能力时，异质性的判决可靠性正在增加。 对于中型陪审团，我们通过模拟发现，陪审员的中位数能力仍应首先投票，其余的能力应增加，然后降低能力。
We consider an odd-sized "jury", which votes sequentially between two states of Nature (say A and B, or Innocent and Guilty) with the majority opinion determining the verdict. Jurors have private information in the form of a signal in [-1,+1], with higher signals indicating A more likely. Each juror has an ability in [0,1], which is proportional to the probability of A given a positive signal, an analog of Condorcet's p for binary signals. We assume that jurors vote honestly for the alternative they view more likely, given their signal and prior voting, because they are experts who want to enhance their reputation (after their vote and actual state of Nature is revealed). For a fixed set of jury abilities, the reliability of the verdict depends on the voting order. For a jury of size three, the optimal ordering is always as follows: middle ability first, then highest ability, then lowest. For sufficiently heterogeneous juries, sequential voting is more reliable than simultaneous voting and is in fact optimal (allowing for non-honest voting). When average ability is fixed, verdict reliability is increasing in heterogeneity. For medium-sized juries, we find through simulation that the median ability juror should still vote first and the remaining ones should have increasing and then decreasing abilities.
