论文标题
通过国家定律和代理商的控制，具有单调互动的平均野外游戏
Mean Field Games with monotonous interactions through the law of states and controls of the agents
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑一类平均现场游戏，其中代理可以通过其状态和控制的统计分布进行互动。据认为，哈密顿人的行为就像其论点的力量，因为它们倾向于无限，指数大于一个。还做出了单调性假设。存在源于单调性假设和leray-schauder定理的先验估计，证明存在和唯一性。给出了结果的应用。
We consider a class of Mean Field Games in which the agents may interact through the statistical distribution of their states and controls. It is supposed that the Hamiltonian behaves like a power of its arguments as they tend to infinity, with an exponent larger than one. A monotonicity assumption is also made. Existence and uniqueness are proved using a priori estimates which stem from the monotonicity assumptions and Leray-Schauder theorem. Applications of the results are given.
