论文标题
摩尔的悖论和信念的逻辑
Moore's Paradox and the logic of belief
论文作者
论文摘要
摩尔悖论是任何正式信仰理论的测试案例。在知识和信念中，Hintikka为表达包含知识和信念概念的句子的陈述开发了一种多模式逻辑。他的帐户声称提供了悖论的解释。在本文中，我认为Hintikkas对其中一位运营商的解释在哲学上是有问题的，并且导致了不必要的逻辑系统。我提供了一种较弱的替代方法，以更准确的方式捕获我们关于信仰概念的逻辑直觉，而又不牺牲为有问题的案例（例如摩尔派帕多克斯）提供解释的可能性。
Moores Paradox is a test case for any formal theory of belief. In Knowledge and Belief, Hintikka developed a multimodal logic for statements that express sentences containing the epistemic notions of knowledge and belief. His account purports to offer an explanation of the paradox. In this paper I argue that Hintikkas interpretation of one of the doxastic operators is philosophically problematic and leads to an unnecessarily strong logical system. I offer a weaker alternative that captures in a more accurate way our logical intuitions about the notion of belief without sacrificing the possibility of providing an explanation for problematic cases such as Moores Paradox.
