论文标题
通过关注最成功的伙伴来阻止叛逃者入侵
Blocking defector invasion by focusing on the most successful partner
论文作者
论文摘要
根据“空间公共物品游戏”的标准协议，合作者不仅投资于自己的游戏，而且投资于邻近合作伙伴组织的游戏。在这项工作中，我们通过允许合作者决定更喜欢哪个相邻群体而不是统一支持他们来放松这一假设。特别是，我们假设他们选择了最成功的邻居，并专门将外部投资集中在相关小组中。我们表明，这种动态规则的这种非常简单的改变导致了令人惊讶的积极进化结果 - 即使在游戏中协同因素的少量价值观中，合作者也占上风。合作者策略所报告成功的微观机制可以通过阻止机制来解释，该机制以偏见的方式影响竞争策略的传播。我们的结果通过使用不同的互动拓扑来保持完整状态，该结果表明，集中个人努力以达到更高的全球福祉可能是有益的。
According to the standard protocol of spatial public goods game, a cooperator player invests not only into his own game but also into the games organized by neighboring partners. In this work, we relax this assumption by allowing cooperators to decide which neighboring group to prefer instead of supporting them uniformly. In particular, we assume that they select their most successful neighbor and focus external investments exclusively into the related group. We show that this very simple alteration of the dynamical rule results in a surprisingly positive evolutionary outcome -- cooperators prevail even in harsh environment represented by small values of the synergy factor in the game. The microscopic mechanism behind the reported success of the cooperator strategy can be explained by a blocking mechanism which affects the propagations of competing strategies in a biased way. Our results, which remain intact by using different interaction topologies, reveal that it could be beneficial to concentrate individual efforts to reach a higher global wellbeing.
