论文标题
通过游戏理论，动力电网中的网络物理攻击的动态攻击防御
Moving-Target Defense Against Cyber-Physical Attacks in Power Grids via Game Theory
论文作者
论文摘要
这项工作提出了一种移动的目标防御（MTD）策略，以检测针对电网的协调网络物理攻击（CCPA）。拟议方法的主要思想是使攻击者使用通过分布式柔性交流传输系统（D-FARC）设备积极扰动网格的传输线电抗来掩盖其物理攻击的影响的知识无效。拟议的MTD设计由两个部分组成。首先，我们确定了D-Facts设备部署的链接子集，该链接可以使后卫检测到CCPAS针对系统中的任何链接。然后，为了最大程度地降低系统运营时间的防御成本，我们制定了零和游戏，以确定针对战略攻击者的最佳链接（这将提供足够的保护）。 NASH平衡鲁棒解决方案是通过指数重量计算的，指数重量不需要完全了解游戏，而只需要在每次迭代时观察到的收益。使用IEEE总线系统上的MATPower模拟器进行的大量模拟验证了我们方法在检测CCPA和降低操作员的防御成本方面的有效性。
This work proposes a moving target defense (MTD) strategy to detect coordinated cyber-physical attacks (CCPAs) against power grids. The main idea of the proposed approach is to invalidate the knowledge that the attackers use to mask the effects of their physical attack by actively perturbing the grid's transmission line reactances via distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices. The proposed MTD design consists of two parts. First, we identify the subset of links for D-FACTS device deployment that enables the defender to detect CCPAs against any link in the system. Then, in order to minimize the defense cost during the system's operational time, we formulate a zero-sum game to identify the best subset of links to perturb (which will provide adequate protection) against a strategic attacker. The Nash equilibrium robust solution is computed via exponential weights, which does not require complete knowledge of the game but only the observed payoff at each iteration. Extensive simulations performed using the MATPOWER simulator on IEEE bus systems verify the effectiveness of our approach in detecting CCPAs and reducing the operator's defense cost.
