论文标题
完整偏好领域的高效且公平的交易机制
Efficient and fair trading mechanisms on the full preference domain
论文作者
论文摘要
Yu和Zhang（2025）引入了一种新方法来定义市场设计中的交易机制，并将其应用于开发新机制，以实现各种模型的效率和公平性。但是，他们对严格偏好的假设限制了其适用性。本文将其方法扩展到了完整的偏好域，从而允许冷漠，同时保留关键效率和公平性能。作为推论，我们将房屋分配模型中的概率序列机制推广到不依赖操作研究工具的情况下。
Yu and Zhang (2025) introduce a new method for defining trading mechanisms in market design and apply it to develop new mechanisms that achieve efficiency and fairness in various models. However, their assumption of strict preferences limits its applicability. This paper extends their approach to the full preference domain, allowing for indifferences while preserving key efficiency and fairness properties. As a corollary, we generalize the probabilistic serial mechanism in the house allocation model to the full preference domain without relying on operations research tools.
