论文标题
悲伤 - 佩纳蒂：对雷击网络中的悲伤攻击的对策
Griefing-Penalty: Countermeasure for Griefing Attack in Lightning Network
论文作者
论文摘要
闪电网络可以执行无限数量的非链付款，而不会产生在区块链中记录它们的成本。但是，此类网络中的有条件付款容易受到悲伤的攻击。在这次攻击中，对手不会以阻止网络的通道容量来解决付款。我们提出了对攻击的有效对策，称为悲伤的痛苦。如果网络中的任何一方进行痛苦的攻击，则需要支付与执行付款的附带费用成正比的罚款。罚款用于补偿网络中受影响的各方。我们提出了一种新的付款协议HTLC-GP或Hash timelock合同，并与悲伤的款式合同，以证明对策的实用性。在将我们的协议与现有付款协议哈希的时间表合同进行比较后，我们观察到，与HTLC相比，攻击者获得的平均收入大大减少了HTLC-GP。我们还研究了路径长度对将悲伤的交易和悲伤速度路由对对手投资的预算进行的影响。鉴于每个付款实例都通过Hop Count 20的路径路线路由，在HTLC-GP中安装悲伤攻击所需的预算是HTLC中攻击者所需的预算的12倍。
Lightning Network can execute unlimited number of off-chain payments, without incurring the cost of recording each of them in the blockchain. However, conditional payments in such networks is susceptible to Griefing Attack. In this attack, an adversary doesn't resolve the payment with the intention of blocking channel capacity of the network. We propose an efficient countermeasure for the attack, known as Griefing-Penalty. If any party in the network mounts a griefing attack, it needs to pay a penalty proportional to the collateral cost of executing a payment. The penalty is used for compensating affected parties in the network. We propose a new payment protocol HTLC-GP or Hashed Timelock Contract with Griefing-Penalty to demonstrate the utility of the countermeasure. Upon comparing our protocol with existing payment protocol Hashed Timelock Contract, we observe that the average revenue earned by the attacker decreases substantially for HTLC-GP as compared to HTLC. We also study the impact of path length for routing a transaction and rate of griefing-penalty on the budget invested by an adversary for mounting the attack. The budget needed for mounting griefing attack in HTLC-GP is 12 times more than the budget needed by attacker in HTLC, given that each payment instance being routed via path length of hop count 20.
