论文标题
一种以CRISPR-CAS为灵感的机制，用于检测FPGA设备中的硬件特洛伊木马
A CRISPR-Cas-Inspired Mechanism for Detecting Hardware Trojans in FPGA Devices
论文作者
论文摘要
近年来，硬件安全性的突出是由于全球化半导体供应链和第三方IP（知识产权）使用增加引起的担忧。特洛伊木马检测对于确保具有机密性，完整性和可用性的系统至关重要。 FPGA（现场可编程门数阵列）中的硬件Trojan检测方法的现有方法包括测试时间方法，实现方法和运行时间方法。前两种方法提供了检测某些木马的有效方法。但是，可以专门设计特洛伊木马，以避免在测试时间或实施之前检测，从而使运行时间检测成为更具吸引力的选择。由于在FPGA上部署的广泛关键系统，因此非常需要运行时间检测和去除特洛伊木马，并且可能很难或昂贵。可以在硬件和自然系统之间绘制许多相似之处，一个例子在硬件攻击和生物攻击之间产生了类比。我们提出了一种以CRISPR-CAS为风格的（群集的定期间隔圆锥体重复序列），用于检测FPGA中的硬件木马。讨论并模拟了1-E CRISPR-CAS机制的基本概念，以通过该生物系统预测遗传信息的流动。该系统的基本结构用于提出一种新型的运行时木马检测方法，名为Cadeft（基于CRISPR-CAS的算法用于检测FPGA Trojans）。探索了不同级别的FPGA应用程序设计流，并提出了CADEFT以在Bitstream级别实现，以监视FPGA的配置BITSTREAM和运行时属性。 CADEFT的灵活性起源于CRISPR-CAS机制的能力，尽管可以识别类似的模式，但可能会对系统构成威胁。
Hardware security has risen in prominence in recent years with concerns stemming from a globalizing semiconductor supply chain and increased third-party IP (intellectual property) usage. Trojan detection is of paramount importance for ensuring systems with confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Existing methods for hardware Trojan detection in FPGA (field programmable gate array) devices include test-time methods, pre-implementation methods, and run-time methods. The first two methods provide effective ways of detecting some Trojans; however, Trojans may be specifically designed to avoid detection at test-time or before implementation making run-time detection a more attractive option. Run-time detection and removal of Trojans is highly desirable due to the wide range of critical systems which are deployed on FPGAs and may be difficult or costly to remove from operation. Many parallels can be drawn between hardware and natural systems, and one example creates an analogy between hardware attacks and biological attacks. We propose a CRISPR-Cas-inspired (clustered regularly interspaced palindromic repeats) method for detecting hardware Trojans in FPGAs. The fundamental concepts of the Type 1-E CRISPR-Cas mechanism are discussed and simulated to predict the flow of genetic information through this biological system. The basic structure of this system is utilized to propose a novel run-time Trojan detection method titled CADEFT (CRISPR-Cas-based Algorithm for DEtection of FPGA Trojans). Different levels of FPGA application design flow are explored, and CADEFT is proposed for realization at the bitstream level to monitor the configuration bitstream and the run-time properties of the FPGA. The flexibility of CADEFT originates in the CRISPR-Cas mechanism's ability to recognize similar albeit previously unseen patterns which may pose a threat to the system.
