论文标题
动态信息设计
Dynamic information design
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑了一个发件人和一个接收器的动态信息设计问题，其中发件人观察者是系统的私人状态，并采取行动根据其观察到接收器发送信号。基于此信号，接收器采取了一个决定发件人和接收器的奖励并控制系统状态的操作。在此技术说明中，我们表明，可以将此问题视为不对称信息的动态游戏及其完美的贝叶斯平衡（PBE）和Stackelberg平衡（SE）的完美游戏，可以使用[1]中提出的算法（同一作者）[2]中提出的算法进行分析。然后，当有一个发件人和多个接收器并提供算法来计算该游戏的平衡时，我们会扩展此模型。
We consider the problem of dynamic information design with one sender and one receiver where the sender observers a private state of the system and takes an action to send a signal based on its observation to a receiver. Based on this signal, the receiver takes an action that determines rewards for both the sender and the receiver and controls the state of the system. In this technical note, we show that this problem can be considered as a problem of dynamic game of asymmetric information and its perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) and Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) can be analyzed using the algorithms presented in [1], [2] by the same author (among others). We then extend this model when there is one sender and multiple receivers and provide algorithms to compute a class of equilibria of this game.
