论文标题
对有意识状态的物理副本的相对主义含义
Relativistic Implications for Physical Copies of Conscious States
论文作者
论文摘要
算法意识的可能性取决于以下假设：可以通过充分复制其潜在的物理状态来复制或重复有意识状态，从而导致各种悖论，包括重复，传送，模拟，自我位置，自我位置，Boltzmann Brain和Wigner的朋友的问题。为了进一步阐明意识的物理性质，我通过分析特殊相对论对精神状态相同副本的发展的含义，尤其是由于量子波动引起的这些演变的差异来挑战这些假设。通过假设有意识的状态在某种足够的潜在物理状态上具有极大的意义，我表明存在两个或多个实例，无论是间距还是时代，具有相同的有意识状态，都会导致逻辑上的矛盾，最终驳斥了有意识状态可以物理地重置为早期状态或任何物理手段重复的假设。解决了一些解释性的假设和含义，尤其是意识，地方性，身体不可逆性和量子无关之间的关系。
The possibility of algorithmic consciousness depends on the assumption that conscious states can be copied or repeated by sufficiently duplicating their underlying physical states, leading to a variety of paradoxes, including the problems of duplication, teleportation, simulation, self-location, the Boltzmann brain, and Wigner's Friend. In an effort to further elucidate the physical nature of consciousness, I challenge these assumptions by analyzing the implications of special relativity on evolutions of identical copies of a mental state, particularly the divergence of these evolutions due to quantum fluctuations. By assuming the supervenience of a conscious state on some sufficient underlying physical state, I show that the existence of two or more instances, whether spacelike or timelike, of the same conscious state leads to a logical contradiction, ultimately refuting the assumption that a conscious state can be physically reset to an earlier state or duplicated by any physical means. Several explanatory hypotheses and implications are addressed, particularly the relationships between consciousness, locality, physical irreversibility, and quantum no-cloning.
