论文标题

Conflux网络中的工程经济学

Engineering Economics in the Conflux Network

论文作者

Cai, Yuxi, Long, Fan, Park, Andreas, Veneris, Andreas

论文摘要

工作证明的区块链需要仔细设计,以创造适当的激励措施,使矿工以可持续的方式忠实地维护网络。本文描述了Conflux网络的经济工程(高吞吐量的区块链)如何导致合理的经济激励措施,以支持理想且可持续的采矿行为。详细介绍,本文参数汇集了收入水平,因此可以产生网络安全性,并描述了这如何取决于用户行为和“策略变量”,例如阻止和兴趣通货膨胀。它还讨论了基础经济工程设计如何使Conflux网络如何抵御双重支出和自私的采矿攻击。

Proof-of-work blockchains need to be carefully designed so as to create the proper incentives for miners to faithfully maintain the network in a sustainable way. This paper describes how the economic engineering of the Conflux Network, a high throughput proof-of-work blockchain, leads to sound economic incentives that support desirable and sustainable mining behavior. In detail, this paper parameterizes the level of income, and thus network security, that Conflux can generate, and it describes how this depends on user behavior and "policy variables'' such as block and interest inflation. It also discusses how the underlying economic engineering design makes the Conflux Network resilient against double spending and selfish mining attacks.

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