学术文献库

The world-changing blockchain technique provides a novel method to establish a secure, trusted and decentralized system for solving the security and personal privacy problems in Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) applications. The mining process in blockchain requires miners to solve a proof-of-work puzzle, which requires high computational power. However, the lightweight IIoT devices cannot directly participate in the mining process due to the limitation of power and computational resources. The edge computing service makes it possible for IIoT applications to build a blockchain network, in which IIoT devices purchase computational resources from edge servers and thus can offload their computational tasks. The amount of computational resource purchased by IIoT devices depends on how many profits they can get in the mining process, and will directly affect the security of the blockchain network. In this paper, we investigate the incentive mechanism for the blockchain platform to attract IIoT devices to purchase more computational power from edge servers to participate in the mining process, thereby building a more secure blockchain network. We model the interaction between the blockchain platform and IIoT devices as a two-stage Stackelberg game, where the blockchain platform act as the leader, and IIoT devices act as followers. We analyze the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium, and propose an efficient algorithm to compute the Stackelberg equilibrium point. Furthermore, we evaluate the performance of our algorithm through extensive simulations, and analyze the strategies of blockchain platform and IIoT devices under different situations.