论文标题
巷道合并的Stackelberg游戏理论模型
A Stackelberg Game Theoretic Model of Lane-Merging
论文作者
论文摘要
以强制性车道变化的形式合并是运输研究中的重要问题。即使安全完成，合并也可能干扰主线的流量并降低道路的效率或容量。在本文中，我们考虑了一个Stackelberg游戏理论驾驶员行为模型，其中所谓的公用事业或回报反映了合并车辆的侵略性，因为它与情况下的决定有关，或者在情况站立之前合并，或在实际换档行动之前加速，减速。还考虑了合并车辆与主线交通的相互作用，因此相应车辆的侵略性结合了主线流程的纵向和横向干扰，以及随后的道路吞吐量减少。本研究以半定量形式表明，这种影响取决于合并和主线车辆的侵略性水平，从而导致该模型在交通流量分析和自动驾驶中的潜在使用。
Merging in the form of a mandatory lane-change is an important issue in transportation research. Even when safely completed, merging may disturb the mainline traffic and reduce the efficiency or capacity of the roadway. In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg game-theoretic driver behavior model where the so-called utilities or payoffs reflect the merging vehicle's aggressiveness as it pertains the decision to merge as the situation stands or to accelerate, decelerate prior to the actual lane-change maneuver. The interaction of the merging vehicle with the mainline traffic is also considered whereby the combination of aggressiveness of the respective vehicles leads to both longitudinal and lateral disturbances to the mainline flow as well as subsequent reduction in the roadway throughput. The present study shows in semi-quantitative form that this impact depends on the level of aggressiveness of the merging and mainline vehicles, leading to the potential use of this model in traffic flow analysis and autonomous driving.
