论文标题
按需移动性动态定价的异常供应短缺
Anomalous supply shortages from dynamic pricing in on-demand mobility
论文作者
论文摘要
动态定价方案越来越多地在整个行业中使用，以保持需求和供应的自组织平衡。但是，在整个复杂的动态系统中，存在意外的集体状态，可能会损害其功能。在这里，我们揭示了动态定价如何引起需求供应不平衡而不是阻止这种不平衡。结合了从点播乘车服务的动态定价数据的游戏理论和时间序列分析，我们解释了这一明显的矛盾。我们得出一个相图，说明在哪些条件下以及在哪种情况下动态定价如何激励乘车驱动器的集体作用，以诱发异常的供应短缺。通过在全球137个地点的价格乘车服务的价格时间序列中删除不同的时间尺度，我们在价格动态中确定了反映这些异常供应短缺的特征模式。我们的结果为调节动态定价（尤其是在公共可访问的移动系统中）的调节提供了系统性见解，该条件在哪种条件下，动态定价方案会促进异常供应短缺。
Dynamic pricing schemes are increasingly employed across industries to maintain a self-organized balance of demand and supply. However, throughout complex dynamical systems, unintended collective states exist that may compromise their function. Here we reveal how dynamic pricing may induce demand-supply imbalances instead of preventing them. Combining game theory and time series analysis of dynamic pricing data from on-demand ride-hailing services, we explain this apparent contradiction. We derive a phase diagram demonstrating how and under which conditions dynamic pricing incentivizes collective action of ride-hailing drivers to induce anomalous supply shortages. By disentangling different timescales in price time series of ride-hailing services at 137 locations across the globe, we identify characteristic patterns in the price dynamics reflecting these anomalous supply shortages. Our results provide systemic insights for the regulation of dynamic pricing, in particular in publicly accessible mobility systems, by unraveling under which conditions dynamic pricing schemes promote anomalous supply shortages.
