论文标题
吸收游戏的不断回报
Constant payoff in absorbing games
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们解决了Sorin，Venel和Vigeral（2010）提出的持续付款猜想，以通过对舞台奖励进行任意评估来吸收游戏。也就是说，存在一对渐近最佳策略，通过评估舞台奖励的索引，以便在游戏的任何一小部分中平均奖励是恒定的。持续的猜测对随机游戏进行任意评估仍然是开放的。
In this paper, we solve the constant-payoff conjecture formulated by Sorin, Venel and Vigeral (2010), for absorbing games with an arbitrary evaluation of the stage rewards. That is, the existence of a pair of asymptotically optimal strategies, indexed by the evaluation of the stage rewards, so that the average rewards are constant on any fraction of the game. That the constant-payoff conjecture holds for stochastic games with an arbitrary evaluation is still open.
