论文标题
针对双面市场的标量参数化机制
A Scalar Parameterized Mechanism for Two-Sided Markets
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑一个市场，供应商和消费者都通过标量参数的供应报价和需求竞标来争夺产品。标量参数的报价/出价由于其建模简单性和理想的数学属性而吸引人，最突出的是在战略互动下的有限效率损失和价格上涨。我们的模型结合了生产能力限制和最低弹性需求需求。在完全竞争的情况下，市场机制产生的分配可最大程度地提高社会福利。当市场参与者对价格进行价格期待时，我们表明存在独特的NASH均衡，并提供了一种计算产生市场分配的有效方法。此外，我们明确地表征了纳什均衡处观察到的福利损失和价格的界限。
We consider a market in which both suppliers and consumers compete for a product via scalar-parameterized supply offers and demand bids. Scalar-parameterized offers/bids are appealing due to their modeling simplicity and desirable mathematical properties with the most prominent being bounded efficiency loss and price markup under strategic interactions. Our model incorporates production capacity constraints and minimum inelastic demand requirements. Under perfect competition, the market mechanism yields allocations that maximize social welfare. When market participants are price-anticipating, we show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, and provide an efficient way to compute the resulting market allocation. Moreover, we explicitly characterize the bounds on the welfare loss and prices observed at the Nash equilibrium.
