论文标题
具有非线性实用程序的代理商的简单机制
Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Non-linear Utilities
论文作者
论文摘要
我们表明，对线性实用程序模型的经济结论大约扩展到非线性效用模型。具体而言，我们量化了具有非线性实用程序的试剂类似于线性实用程序的代理的程度，并且我们表明，具有线性公用事业的试剂的机理的近似值大约扩展了具有非线性公用事业的试剂。 我们说明了非线性模型的收入和福利目标的框架，包括具有预算限制的代理，具有风险避免风险的代理商以及具有内源性估值的代理商的框架。我们得出了这些模型类似于线性实用程序模型的数量的边界，并将这些边界与线性实用程序模型的近似结果结合在一起。我们得出的结论是，对于这些非线性试剂模型，简单的机制大致是最佳的。
We show that economic conclusions derived from Bulow and Roberts (1989) for linear utility models approximately extend to non-linear utility models. Specifically, we quantify the extent to which agents with non-linear utilities resemble agents with linear utilities, and we show that the approximation of mechanisms for agents with linear utilities approximately extend for agents with non-linear utilities. We illustrate the framework for the objectives of revenue and welfare on non-linear models that include agents with budget constraints, agents with risk aversion, and agents with endogenous valuations. We derive bounds on how much these models resemble the linear utility model and combine these bounds with well-studied approximation results for linear utility models. We conclude that simple mechanisms are approximately optimal for these non-linear agent models.
