论文标题
双重反击：在工作证明系统中的报复威胁
Double-Spend Counterattacks: Threat of Retaliation in Proof-of-Work Systems
论文作者
论文摘要
工作证明旨在为重复攻击提供稳健性的区块链。但是，《 Budish》（2018年）之后的经济分析考虑了自由入境条件，并能够租用足够的哈希雷特（Hashrate）进行攻击，这表明由此产生的阻止奖励可以使攻击廉价。我们为双重攻击做出了正式的防御。我们表明，当受害者可以以与攻击者相同的方式进行反击时，这会导致经典游戏理论战争模型的变化。这种反攻击的威胁引起了一个子游戏的完美平衡，在这种平衡中首先不会发生攻击。
Proof-of-Work mining is intended to provide blockchains with robustness against double-spend attacks. However, an economic analysis that follows from Budish (2018), which considers free entry conditions together with the ability to rent sufficient hashrate to conduct an attack, suggests that the resulting block rewards can make an attack cheap. We formalize a defense to double-spend attacks. We show that when the victim can counterattack in the same way as the attacker, this leads to a variation on the classic game-theoretic War of Attrition model. The threat of this kind of counterattack induces a subgame perfect equilibrium in which no attack occurs in the first place.
