论文标题
在不平衡的分配系统中,PMU GPS欺骗的攻击识别和校正
Attack Identification and Correction for PMU GPS Spoofing in Unbalanced Distribution Systems
论文作者
论文摘要
由于平民全球定位系统(GPS)信号的脆弱性,因此,GPS欺骗攻击(GSA)可以极大地损害相组量测量单元(PMU)的准确性,该攻击(GSA)将相位转移到真实的相位角度测量中。本文专注于多个PMU位置的GSA,提出了一种新颖的识别和校正算法。首先实施对单个GSA相角的状态估计残差的敏感性分析。提出了使用探测技术的识别算法来确定欺骗PMU的位置和GSA相移的范围。基于识别结果,这些GSA相移是通过估计算法确定的,该算法可以最大程度地减少测量和系统状态之间的不匹配。此外,经过攻击的PMU数据纠正,系统状态将恢复。 IEEE 34-BUS和123个总线分布系统中的模拟证明了该方法的效率和准确性。
Due to the vulnerability of civilian global positioning system (GPS) signals, the accuracy of phasor measurement units (PMUs) can be greatly compromised by GPS spoofing attacks (GSAs), which introduce phase shifts into true phase angle measurements. Focusing on simultaneous GSAs for multiple PMU locations, this paper proposes a novel identification and correction algorithm in distribution systems. A sensitivity analysis of state estimation residuals on a single GSA phase angle is firstly implemented. An identification algorithm using a probing technique is proposed to determine the locations of spoofed PMUs and the ranges of GSA phase shifts. Based on the identification results, these GSA phase shifts are determined via an estimation algorithm that minimizes the mismatch between measurements and system states. Further, with the attacked PMU data corrected, the system states are recovered. Simulations in unbalanced IEEE 34-bus and 123-bus distribution systems demonstrates the efficiency and accuracy of the proposed method.