论文标题
沉重的尾巴使买家快乐
Heavy Tails Make Happy Buyers
论文作者
论文摘要
在I.I.D.的第二价格拍卖中（独立分布的）出价者估值，如果估值的分配足够沉重，则增加竞标者会增加预期的买家盈余。虽然这并不意味着拍卖中的投标人应该更喜欢更多的投标人加入拍卖，但这确实意味着投标人应该更喜欢它，以换取允许投标人参加更多拍卖。同样，对于重尾估值分配，即使已经有很多投标人，每增加一个投标人的差额预期卖方收入仍然很强。
In a second-price auction with i.i.d. (independent identically distributed) bidder valuations, adding bidders increases expected buyer surplus if the distribution of valuations has a sufficiently heavy right tail. While this does not imply that a bidder in an auction should prefer for more bidders to join the auction, it does imply that a bidder should prefer it in exchange for the bidder being allowed to participate in more auctions. Also, for a heavy-tailed valuation distribution, marginal expected seller revenue per added bidder remains strong even when there are already many bidders.
