论文标题
计算战略性脱碳途径：偶然受限的平衡问题
Computing a Strategic Decarbonization Pathway: A Chance-Constrained Equilibrium Problem
论文作者
论文摘要
美国传输系统和批发电力市场，尽管受到联邦监管，通常涉及多个州管辖区。在这种环境中，国家监管机构可以战略利用这种技术经济联合以促进其清洁能源政策目标，而牺牲邻国司法管辖区。本文调查了战略监管竞争，以了解其对实现可再生投资组合标准（RPS）的影响。我们通过平衡约束（CC-EPEC）制定了一个偶然受限的平衡问题，该问题考虑了多个州监管机构，与州内电力公司协调，以最低成本的方式实施RPS目标。为了解决此CC-EPEC，我们自定义了渐进式套期保值（pH）算法。该案例研究使用CCEPEC和PH算法来分析ISO新英格兰系统中国家监管竞争的影响。
US transmission systems and wholesale electricity markets, albeit federally regulated, often span across multiple state jurisdictions. In this environment, state regulators can strategically exploit this techno-economic coupling to advance their clean energy policy goals at the expense of neighboring jurisdictions. This paper investigates strategic regulatory competition to understand its effect on achieving Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS). We formulate a chance-constrained equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (CC-EPEC), which considers multiple state regulators, acting in coordination with in-state power companies, to implement RPS goals in the least-cost manner. To solve this CC-EPEC, we customize a Progressive Hedging (PH) algorithm. The case study uses the CCEPEC and PH algorithm to analyze the effects of state regulatory competition in the ISO New England system.
