论文标题
单峰偏好的蛋糕切割公平和效率
Fairness and Efficiency in Cake-Cutting with Single-Peaked Preferences
论文作者
论文摘要
当代理人对蛋糕的偏好单点偏好时，我们研究了切蛋糕的问题。我们表明，Wang-Wu（2019）最近提出的机制获得无嫉妒的分配可以产生巨大的福利损失。使用简化的假设，我们表征了所有具有简单结构的帕累托最佳分配：峰值是峰值且非废物。最后，我们提供了简单的替代机制，可以使王量占主导地位，并实现嫉妒或帕累托最优性。
We study the cake-cutting problem when agents have single-peaked preferences over the cake. We show that a recently proposed mechanism by Wang-Wu (2019) to obtain envy-free allocations can yield large welfare losses. Using a simplifying assumption, we characterize all Pareto optimal allocations, which have a simple structure: are peak-preserving and non-wasteful. Finally, we provide simple alternative mechanisms that Pareto dominate that of Wang-Wu, and which achieve envy-freeness or Pareto optimality.
