论文标题
全薪拍卖有不同的没收
All-Pay Auctions with Different Forfeits
论文作者
论文摘要
在拍卖中，各方都有一定的竞标，而竞标最高的人是赢家。有趣的是，拍卖也可以用作其他现实世界系统的模型。在全部薪水拍卖中，所有各方都必须支付竞标。在最常见的所有薪水拍卖中，各方都没收了他们的全部出价，这被视为政治运动支出的典范。在这里，我们考虑了许多替代性没收，这些没收可能被用作不同现实世界竞赛的模型，例如为国防或基础设施合同准备竞标。
In an auction each party bids a certain amount and the one which bids the highest is the winner. Interestingly, auctions can also be used as models for other real-world systems. In an all pay auction all parties must pay a forfeit for bidding. In the most commonly studied all pay auction, parties forfeit their entire bid, and this has been considered as a model for expenditure on political campaigns. Here we consider a number of alternative forfeits which might be used as models for different real-world competitions, such as preparing bids for defense or infrastructure contracts.
