论文标题
发件人批准的战略信息传输
Strategic information transmission with sender's approval
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑使用发件人有外部选项的发件人接收器游戏。在廉价谈话阶段之后，接收者向发件人提出了建议，后者可以拒绝。我们研究了发件人批准对接收者至关重要的情况。我们表明，如果发送者只有两种类型，或者如果接收者对决策的偏好不取决于发件人的类型，则只要发件人的偏好不取决于发件人的类型，就会存在分区（完美的贝叶斯nash）平衡。结果没有扩展：我们构造一个反示例（用于发件人的三种类型和类型依赖性的仿射函数），其中没有混合平衡。在三种类型的情况下，我们提供了（可能介导的）平衡的全面表征。
We consider a sender-receiver game with an outside option for the sender. After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject. We study situations in which the sender's approval is crucial to the receiver.We show that a partitional, (perfect Bayesian Nash) equilibrium exists if the sender has only two types or if the receiver's preferences over decisions do not depend on the type of the sender as long as the latter participates. The result does not extend: we construct a counter-example (with three types for the sender and type-dependent affine utility functions) in which there is no mixed equilibrium. In the three type case, we provide a full characterization of (possibly mediated) equilibria.
