论文标题
国际比赛中的双边关税
Bilateral Tariffs Under International Competition
论文作者
论文摘要
本文探讨了两国从事非合作双边贸易的最大化问题。考虑了不同价格系统下商品交换的概率模型。交换商品的数量决定了每个国家对反对货币的需求。但是，每个国家都可以通过对进口商品征收关税来操纵这一数量。只要从贸易获得的收益取决于进口商品和出口商品之间的余额，这种情况就会导致一个两方游戏，在该游戏中，NASH平衡关税是针对各种外币需求功能确定的，最终获得了基于最佳关税的汇率。
This paper explores the gain maximization problem of two nations engaging in non-cooperative bilateral trade. Probabilistic model of an exchange of commodities under different price systems is considered. Volume of commodities exchanged determines the demand each nation has over the counter party's currency. However, each nation can manipulate this quantity by imposing a tariff on imported commodities. As long as the gain from trade is determined by the balance between imported and exported commodities, such a scenario results in a two party game where Nash equilibrium tariffs are determined for various foreign currency demand functions and ultimately, the exchange rate based on optimal tariffs is obtained.
