论文标题
主食不利选择下的最佳合同：实物保险的效率
Optimal contracts under adverse selection for staple goods: efficiency of in-kind insurance
论文作者
论文摘要
收入损失可能会对家庭产生负面影响，迫使他们减少对某些主食的消费。这可能导致健康问题，因此为社会带来了巨大的成本。我们建议，消费者可以防止这些负面后果购买保险，以确保他们失去一部分收入，以确保他们的主食有益。我们开发了一个两期/两种良好的主体代理问题，并使用不利选择和内源性保留效用，以模拟具有实物利益的保险。该模型使我们能够为保险合同获得半明确的解决方案，并应用于燃料贫困的背景。对于此应用，我们的模型可以得出结论，即使从家庭的角度来看，即使在垄断提供保险时，这种机制也会通过确保足够的能源消耗来大大降低家庭燃料贫困的风险。通过与收入保险进行比较，强调了实物保险的有效性，但是我们的结果仍然强调了规范这种保险市场的需求。
An income loss can have a negative impact on households, forcing them to reduce their consumption of some staple goods. This can lead to health issues and, consequently, generate significant costs for society. We suggest that consumers can, to prevent these negative consequences, buy insurance to secure sufficient consumption of a staple good if they lose part of their income. We develop a two-period/two-good principal-agent problem with adverse selection and endogenous reservation utility to model insurance with in-kind benefits. This model allows us to obtain semi-explicit solutions for the insurance contract and is applied to the context of fuel poverty. For this application, our model allows to conclude that, even in the least efficient scenario from the households point of view, i.e., when the insurance is provided by a monopoly, this mechanism decreases significantly the risk of fuel poverty of households by ensuring them a sufficient consumption of energy. The effectiveness of in-kind insurance is highlighted through a comparison with income insurance, but our results nevertheless underline the need to regulate such insurance market.
